

**PILDAT**

**International Conference  
Civil-Military Relations**

October 21-22, 2008  
Hotel Avari, Lahore, Pakistan

**Civil-Military Relations  
Reforms in Indonesia:  
A Case Study**



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
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## Preface

**Civil-Military Relations Reforms in Indonesia: A Case Study** was co-presented by **Mr. Ali Abdullah Wibisono** and **Dr. Makmur Keliat** from University of Indonesia at the **PILDAT International Conference on Civil-Military Relations**: October 21-22, 2008, Lahore, Pakistan.

PILDAT International Conference on Civil-Military Relations was held from October 21-22, 2008, at Lahore, Pakistan. The objective of the Conference was to showcase international and regional experiences and best practices in improving civil-military relations. Experts on civil-military relations from India, Turkey, Indonesia & Europe were part of the conference to present case studies and best practices on how to maintain and manage civil-military relations within an established constitutional and legal framework and move towards democratic consolidation. Pakistani Experts and academics, representatives of political parties and a large number of young professionals and students also participated in the two-day conference to discuss and brainstorm issues affecting civil-military relations in Pakistan and to reiterate the parameters of exclusive domains, as well as the overlapping and shared areas, of the civil and the military in Pakistan as a way forward for the country.

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
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## Profiles of the Authors


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## **Indonesia: Reforms in Civil-Military Relations: 1998-2008**

### **Introduction**

Indonesia's reform in civil-military relations has entered a new decade. Three achievements in the first decade comprise normative-legal instruments in the military and defence sectors, as well as police and human rights in a general security sector reform; disengagement of the military from political activities, including the parliament, party politics, and public offices; and more importantly reform in the department of defence that resulted in increasing role of civilian-led department of defence in policy making, specifically in terms of arms acquisition and defence budget.

This paper evaluates the effectiveness of civil-military relations in Indonesia after ten years of reform. Effective civil-military relations should be in the form of objective civilian control over the armed forces which is indicated by:

- 1) military's adoption of professional ethos and their recognition of boundaries of their professional roles;
- 2) effective subordination of the military to civilian political leadership that formulates strategic directives on foreign and military policies;
- 3) recognition and approval from political leaders to the professional authorities and autonomy of the military; and
- 4) minimal intervention of the military in politics and of politicians in military affairs (Huntington, 1957: 83-85)

This author maintains that professionalism of the military requires effective and ongoing interaction between civilian and military in the defence sector. This means not only the absence of involvement of the military in politics but also strong commitment of the civilian policy-makers in defence to maintaining professional military forces. In addition, professional military also requires a strategic culture that perceives military forces as instruments of defending and deterring against external threats or potential threats.

There are three main sections in this paper. The first part discusses the overview of Indonesian civil-military

relations reform as part of the Indonesian Security Sector Reform (SSR). This section tries to show that civil-military relations was at the heart of Indonesian security sector reform agenda when it started in 1998, and that Indonesian civil society and epistemic community performed a central role in initiating and maintaining Indonesian security sector reform. The second section discusses the achievements in the first decade of Indonesian military reform. It shows that while Indonesian military has successfully withdrawn from politics, an effective civil-military relation has not been achieved in Indonesia, since civilian political leaders are lacking in commitments and capacities in defence affairs. The third sections offers a recommendation that reforms in civil-military relations may best be approached through a balanced emphasis on military's withdrawal from politics and preparation of civilian politicians and bureaucratic capacities in defence policy formulation. Towards the end, ten key lessons from the Indonesian experience of security reforms are listed.

### **Civil-Military Relations in Indonesian Security Sector Reform**

The initiation of civil-military relations reform in Indonesia was part of the larger framework of Security Sector Reform (SSR) which began to emerge as democratization process started in 1998. From the onset many observers emphasised that security sector must be regarded as one of the forms of public service and thus must be part of state's responsibility. As a public good or public service, the conduct of security functions must be in accordance with the standards of efficiency, equity, and accountability that should be applied to other public sectors.

The initial agenda of the Indonesian SSR was mainly on re-arranging civil-military relations in parallel with democratic principles, in which the military should be under an effective democratic control of a civilian government. In order to achieve such condition, withdrawal of the military from politics and business was very much at the heart of the Indonesian SSR.

However, withdrawal of the armed forces from political domain should not be the sole purpose of reform in civil-military relations. This process requires two principle conditions that must take place simultaneously and gain equal importance: professionalisation of the military and

objective civilian control of the armed forces. For the military, professionalism translates to their capability and capacity to defend the nation from external threats as well as deterring potential threats.

But the military is only one actor in the defence sector, and a praetorian military is able to conduct the whole defence sector, both policy making and operations, without significant involvement of civilian politicians, if at all. Disengagement of military from politics, which means transforming their character from praetorian to professional, will logically require civilian politicians and bureaucrats to replace positions previously occupied by active military officers. Thus, withdrawal of the military from politics must be conducted in tandem with strengthening civilian politicians' capacities in conducting policy formulation and oversight of the defence sector.

### **Military Withdrawal from Politics**

Internal reform agenda of the military suggest that withdrawal from politics was the willingness of the military itself as well as requirement of the democratisation process. Why did the Indonesian military, early on the reform era, choose to disengage itself from politics, albeit gradually at a pace of its own choosing?

It is worthwhile to note that the Indonesian Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia - TNI) involvement in politics was not preceded by a military coup over a civilian government as occurred in military regimes of the world. The TNI's main reason for its involvement in Indonesian politics lies in the institution's own conception of the role and responsibility in safeguarding the nation against political stability. The TNI's experience in playing central role in the struggle against the Dutch and suppression of local rebellions in the 1950s and the abortive coup in 1965 have built a conception of the armed forces as guardian against potential betrayals to the nation. This conception was embodied in the doctrine called *dwifungsi* or dual function.

During the Suharto era, military's role was primarily to maintain regime's survival against potential domestic political rivals. Although there were factions in the TNI that strived to achieve independence from subordination to the regime, they were always marginalised by the regime, until pro-democracy protests emerged in 1998. Military's

involvement in politics was nurtured by a dominating preconception of internal threats primacy to Indonesia. This dominating threat perception led to a wrong direction of military capability development. Instead of establishing standing forces that can serve as deterrent power and quick response to threats should deterrence fail (Segal & Segal, 1983), Indonesia developed its armed forces to respond mainly to internal threats that can compromise national territorial and ideological integrity.

The TNI's involvement in politics met almost no resistance from civilian politicians in power who were keen to use the military's political support to strengthen their regimes. Sukarno had used the military to balance the emergence of Indonesian Communist Party in the early to mid-1960s, while Suharto's regime was mainly supported by a tandem of Golkar Party, the TNI, and the bureaucracy. During the reform era, the TNI's political approval to a certain national leader, albeit never expressed explicitly, determined the leader's political survival while in power.

There are at least three factors that could explain the withdrawal of the military from politics. They are embedded in the three major components of the nation in terms of civil-military relations: the government, the society, and the military itself.

Military withdrawal from politics could not be made possible without mutually benefitting agreement between incumbent Indonesian governments of the reform era and the military, which only suggests that the military is still influencing civilian political positions. While being able to divide and rule the armed forces to keep them in position to support its security, Suharto's regime was not able to counter the consolidation among the forces previously marginalized within the ranks of the military.

The following Presidents after the fall of Suharto, however, would have to maintain a good relationship with the military. President Habibie was dependant on the support of the military, which was given by the latter on the pretext of their independence in setting up their own pace for internal reform. Absence of military support to succeeding government led by President Wahid, and the government's radical efforts to reform the military resulted in the president's impeachment. Learning from his mistake, President Soekarnoputri was really careful, if not reluctant,

in continuing military reform. Although relying on more or less considerable support of the armed forces, the leadership of these three presidents allowed the efforts for civil-military relations reform to take place, especially in terms of normative-legal instruments in civilian oversight on the armed forces, but civilian role in defence policy-making requires further strengthening. Despite being a retired army general, President Yudhoyono has not managed to consolidate civilian supremacy over the armed forces as civilian policy-makers are still unable to effectively influence doctrinal change within the military, as well as maintain good governance in defence budget.

Military withdrawal from politics was also generated out of pro-democracy protests that went off in early 1998. These pro-democracy protests brought up organisations and individuals that were previously marginalized by the Suharto regime. They created a considerable attraction to the military leadership who was looking for an alliance to strengthen his position vis-à-vis the Suharto regime, as well as to secure political positions in post Suharto era.

Internal rivalries within the armed forces can be seen as another contributor to military withdrawal from politics. What has been constantly in existence is factionalization within the armed forces, between regime loyalists and reformists. The reformist minded officers have been aspiring to become independent from the regime and develop a new doctrine for the armed forces, while those who were loyal to the regime have been looking forward to maintain the role merely tool of power for the government (Sebastian, 2006: 324).

One contestation that determined the course of military's eventual toleration to transition from Suharto's authoritarian government was the one between Gen. Wiranto and Lt. Gen. Prabowo Subianto, both of whom were competing for leadership in the armed forces. Subianto was favoured by Suharto for his seemingly strong Islamic credentials, while Wiranto opposed the Islamisation of the armed forces and the whole nation for a belief that Islamic movements were potentially linked to Islamic rebellion remnants of the 1950s. Being a younger officer, Subianto often undermined Wiranto's leadership in the armed forces, even forming his own elite unit of Tim Mawar (rose team) in the Army Special Forces (Kopasus) in order to execute abduction of several activists. What followed from this contestation is Wiranto's

alliance with a major Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama, which was sidelined during Suharto regime, and his ability to consolidate an alliance with the then-soon-to-be President Habibie. With sufficient domestic political support and full loyalty of the armed forces, Wiranto was able to defy President Suharto's order to establish state of emergency and martial law to terminate pro-democracy protests.

For a major part of its one decade period, civil-military relations reform in Indonesia was negotiation process between scholars and civil society organizations and prominent reform-minded officials in the TNI. Democratization process that began in 1998, gave prominent leverage to the CSOs who were able to exercise an effective pressure to the military and the government to implement democratic control of the armed forces, as well as other security forces, which must be preceded by disengagement of active military personnel from all sorts of political (and business) activities.

The argument that gained public support for this agenda was clear that as long as military actors held public offices and maintained independent source of funding for their prosperity and activities civilian control, especially through parliamentary conducts, would never materialize.

Moreover, the history of TNI's constant involvement in politics suggests that such involvement had weakened the Indonesian military's professionalism. Intervention in public sector and day-to-day politics absorbed military's attention, priorities, and resources to non-defence sectors. Military's heavy intervention in public sector also generated a pre-occupation with internal threats of the republic and tendency to neglect the need to defend national territories against external threats and mount a credible deterrence against potential enemies. Indonesia's most recent white defence paper released in 2008, still maintains this pre-occupation on internal security problems. On the other hand the TNI's participation in politics also created a trade off to the government's lack of priority in the defence sector. This point seems to be in line with findings of research on military regimes in 1960s and 1970s which suggest that military regimes never increased their military expenditures after undertaking a coup.

Serious lack of government funding to military expenditure

created off-budget sources to military activities that persist to this day, a situation that not only adds to problems of transparency, accountability and corruption, but undermines the TNI's defence role by diverting focus to seeking funds. Lack of adequate budget for salaries, training, education, welfare, maintenance and purchase of equipment would undermine discipline, morale, and operational capacity of the armed forces.

Indonesia's defence budget weakness prevails to this day. We have only learnt that increasing the appropriation for defence does not automatically solve the problem. Performance based planning and budgeting as well as clean and responsible governance in defence sector are also critical to maintaining optimal defence spending. Indonesia's national taxation and revenue systems, as well as budget priorities, must also still be improved before the military can be fully funded by the defence budget. Until then, the military will find excuses to continue its secretive business empires for its operational and equipment funding.

Military's intervention in politics also exacerbated security problems in Indonesia. Several factors had made this theoretically possible. First, military institution is never prepared to participate in politics and thus always lacking or not able to manage the aggregated complexities of a modern state. Secondly, military institutions tend to create specific units in order to overcome certain civilian problems which in the end only exacerbate matters. These special units are counter-productive in overcoming roots of conflict and avoiding new ones since conflicts are usually rooted in dissatisfaction to economic, social, cultural, and political condition rather than security. Indeed, military was only but one actor in conflict resolution among other civilian institutions. Thirdly, military institutions also depend on civilian governmental infrastructure to ensure effectiveness of their intervention in public sector. The fusion of bureaucratic infrastructure and military's chain of command created a "garrison state" that instilled fear and obedience among the public. In the longer term, public increasingly took military intervention in politics as given, even necessary. Military's support to an incumbent leader is perceived to be an essential ingredient for his/her political survival. Even in today's Indonesian politics, retired military officers still aspire to exercise their fortunes in gaining positions in public offices, even though public support to these persons has been decreasing.

By advocating these lines of arguments through the media, scholars and activists were able to exercise public support for the withdrawal of the military from politics. However, it is also noteworthy that withdrawal from politics was on the TNI's agenda since the beginning of reform, as indicated by their 1998 'New Paradigm' document, describing how they perceived their roles in politics.

Despite the fact that civil society communities were able to influence the process of military withdrawal from politics, the pace and extent of such withdrawal was determined largely by the military itself. Internal reform agendas of the military resulted in various amendments of internal regulations that led to the re-adjustment of the military to its constitutional role of state's defence apparatus. These internal reform agendas include:

- abolishment of socio-political division within the military
- reduction of political contents within the armed forces academy's curricula
- termination of the TNI personnel employment in public offices
- separation of TNI and Polri (the national Police)
- withdrawal of all TNI personnel from the parliament
- redefinition of territorial command
- termination of TNI's business activities
- withdrawal of TNI personnel from formal assignment in governmental posts

### **Achievements and Stagnation in Civil-Military Relations Reform**

Practically all constituents of change of civil-military relations reform agreed to start this re-arrangement process on the policy level by re-arranging the laws and regulations in military and defence affairs, thus creating a sound legal basis for a democratic and legitimate transition process.

The Indonesian military has made significant changes since the resignation of Suharto as president in 1998. The most important of these is withdrawal from day-to-day political activity, and strict neutrality in democratic politics. In 2004, the military relinquished its reserved seats in

parliament and regional assemblies, while the constitution now requires military personnel to retire or resign before running for elective or appointive civilian government posts. This is a significant change from Suharto's time, when thousands of military personnel filled civilian government positions at every level.

Throughout the decade since 1998, the TNI has indicated a major reduction of its social and political role. Beginning with the TNI's withdrawal from performing a central role in maintaining social and political order in 1998, gradual abolishment of the TNI and Polri membership in the parliament from 1999 to 2004, its commitment to never

again participate in day-to-day politics in 2000, elimination of social-political elements in military academy in 2001, redefinition of roles and functions of territorial command in 2002, commitment of neutrality in elections in 2004, early retirement for the TNI personnel who wish to pursue public offices in local elections in 2006, take-over of the TNI's business enterprises by the government in 2006, and finally a new joint forces doctrine produced in 2007. A complete agenda of military reforms, that has been accomplished in the last one decade, is listed below.

No.	Reform Agenda	Status	Year
1	Withdrawal of all active military personnel from civilian public offices	Finished	1998
2	Separation of military (TNI) and the national police (POLRI)	Finished	1999
3	Elimination of military role in formal political policy-making process	Finished	1999
4	Military's declarations of political neutrality, disengagement from Golkar	Finished	1999
5	Organizational re-arrangement of Department of Defence	Finished	1999
6	Appointment of a civilian minister of defence	Finished	1999
7	Parliamentary empowerment in oversight capacity over the TNI	Partly finished	1999
8	Abolition of Dwi Fungsi doctrine	Finished	2000
9	Redefinition of TNI role: focusing on external defence	Finished	2000
10	Abolishment social-political division in Department of Home Affairs	Finished	2000
11	Abolishment of National Stability Coordinating Body (Bakorstanas)	Finished	2000
12	Human Rights Law enactment	Finished	2000
13	State Defence Law enactment	Finished	2002
14	TNI Law enactment	Finished	2004
15	Withdrawal of active military officers from the parliament	Finished	2004
16	Withdrawal active military officers from National Consultative Assembly (higher parliament)	Finished	2004

Meanwhile, listed below are the legal-normative products in the defence sector that have been produced during the last decade of Indonesian military reform:

No.	Reform Agenda	Status	Year
1	State Defence Law	Finished	2002
2	Defence White Paper	Finished	2003
3	Policy directive on State Defence	Finished	2008
4	Take-Over of TNI's business enterprises	Finished	2008
5	State Defence Strategy	Finished	2008
6	State Defence Posture	Finished	2008
7	State Defence Doctrine	Finished	2008
8	Defence White Paper	Finished	2008

All these changes have clearly suggested that efforts to disengage the military from daily political activities were made both by civilian politicians and the military. The TNI's withdrawal from politics, however, does not necessarily translate to their willingness to abide by civilian supremacy, which has not substantially materialized in Indonesia. To say that the TNI has completely taken off from politics would require other considerations.

First, none of the TNI's internal changes have stated a total abolition of *Dwifungsi* doctrine. Is it possible that a doctrine has been the *lingua franca* of the military for many decades, entrenched and transferred from one generation of armed forces to another, can be eliminated in just one decade? The fact is senior leaders in the Indonesian Army still maintained that the military holds a responsibility to avoid civilian government from sidelining Indonesia's national interests (Beeson, Bellamy, & Hughes, 2006).

Secondly, loyalty to the nation-state, rather than obedience to incumbent governments, has always been more emphasised in the tradition of the armed forces, as suggested by their professional oath (*Sapta Marga*), in which soldiers swear their loyalty to the unitary Republic of Indonesia based on *Pancasila* and 1945 Constitution.

Thirdly, the military is not totally "immune" from government appointment to hold positions in public offices. Active military officers are government's most likely source of appointees for leadership in local regions whenever a power vacuum is resulted from a long dispute in local elections.

Finally, there is an absence of objective civilian control of the armed forces, as a prime instrument in exercising civilian supremacy over the military, which owes largely to civilian incapacities in defence management. Over-emphasis on military withdrawal from politics seemed to disregard the argument that the effectiveness of civilian bureaucracy in critical sectors of the government may be an effective neutralizer to military's potentials in political intervention.

Indonesia's military reform for the past one decade has emphasized mainly on the political dimension in terms of re-arrangement/normalization of civil-military relations. If we look at these achievements we can find out that

substantive reforms that should be conducted by Department of Defence, instead of the military, in the form of building a professional military through formulations of defence doctrines, improving governance in weapons procurement management, and developing an epistemic community for strategic and defence studies are still minimum and have only taken place recently. Rarely talked about agendas are defence economy and force deployment posture. With regard to the fact that the military has disengaged from politics, all these unresolved issues are matters of political decision in defence management.

If we look at the list of achievements above, we can see that the pace of reform within a decade of military reform in Indonesia seemed to slow down after its first four years. Military disengagement from political activities and parliamentary advocacy programmes were widely executed between 1998-2002. The years that followed, however, showed that the pace began to stagnate. Several factors can be attributed as responsible for this stagnation. First, the fragmentation among elite civilian politicians has not seemed to show aggregation of political powers along the line of national interests; instead they have been too busy securing their own interests. Many civilian politicians thus exploited a partnership with the military, not for the sake of establishing good governance in defence sector, but to persuade them to participate in politics and lend them support.

Secondly, a nationalist-conservative fervour seemed to reign among civilian politicians who perceived that a strong military to deter foreign threats and large defence expenditure to cover it are the only solutions to problems in our defence sector. This line of thinking also quickly gained ground among public, hence sidelining more important agendas of establishing a sound basis for control of the armed forces, responsive and visionary policy-making in the defence establishment, and clean governance in the military, department of defence and the parliament.

Finally, the weakening state of pace in the military reform created an opportunity for the build up of resistance to change in the military. The military began to publicise its own research and reports that argue for the self-preserving nature of internal reform within the armed forces that no longer require "intervention" from public, especially from those who they deemed "lay-men" in defence and military



affairs.

Thus, in spite of their significant achievements, the first generation has not yet overcome the limitations of the civilian bodies in conducting oversight and policy-making over the military, as well as controlling the residual capacities of the military to participate in politics through non-institutional means.

Meanwhile second generation of military reform includes efforts to provide substantive capacities of new civilian institutions, state institutions as well as civil society, in order to conduct civilian oversight over the military. Listed below are agendas that are left to the second generation of military reform:

No.	Reform Agenda	Current Status	Category
1	Revision of territorial command	Ready blueprint, but revision effort halted in 2001	Deployment
2	Reduction of off- state budget income to the military	Government already legitimized take-over of profit-oriented businesses owned by the military, but not to include cooperatives and foundations.	Defence Economy
3	Subordination of TNI Headquarter to Department of Defence	TNI is still directly responsible to the President, instead of DoD	Organization
4	Civilian court for military NCOs offenders	Regulations are not yet discussed.	Oversight
5	Human rights court empowerment	No following actions were taken after high-ranking officers were released in 2003 and 2005	Oversight
6	Civilians in Department of Defence	Most of DoD's officials are still military officers.	Organization
7	Establishment of National Security Council under civilian leadership	Discussed since 2002, but no real policies are undertaken yet	Normative
8	Total control of government and parliament over defence budget	Self-financing practices of the military still take place.	Defence economy
9	Effective civilian control over defence expenditure	State auditors' authority for defence budget is still limited	Defence economy
10	Cross-institutional review on national threats and military posture	Military elites are solely in charge for threat and defence posture assessment	Substantial
11	Credible and transparent military court system	Public still take for granted military personnel impunity	Oversight
12	Professionally conducted weapons procurement process	Network between the military and procurement agencies are still dominant and rampant with corruption	Substantial
13	Military bureaucracy abides by the executive decision	Increasingly in such direction, but loyalty to the figure of the President still counts the most	Organization
14	Civilian epistemic community on defence	Developing, but with limited resources	Substantial



As the list of unfinished agendas of reform suggests, even previous accomplishment such as withdrawal of the armed forces from politics has not produced military subordination to democratic control. Thus, while in the last decade of military reform, Indonesia has managed to create some of the required legal-constitutional products to disengage the military from civilian realms, the next generation of military reform should undertake organizational, substantial, economic aspects that were never thoroughly discussed. Organizational reforms were directed towards subordination of military under effective civilian control. Substantial reforms were directed towards reformulation of armed forces doctrine, effective control of defence procurement, and enlargement of epistemic community of civilians and military personnel that are able to influence defence policy making. Agendas of second generation of military reform also put heavier emphasis on forces deployment schemes reform.

## **Ten Lessons from the Indonesian Experience of Security Sector Reform**

### **First Lesson**

Civil-military relations needs to be put in the security sector reform. Security sector reform itself needs to be understood as an integral part of comprehensive democratic political reform. No reform would have taken place if Suharto was still in power.

### **Second Lesson**

There should be broad consensus between major political parties that security sector reform is a must for the purpose of sustaining democratic process. There should also be broad consensus between civilian and military on a number of issues:

- (1) state ideology
- (2) constitution (unitary state)
- (3) historical legacy

### **Third Lesson**

There should be clear focus on how to undertake security reform. The main focus should be on transforming security actors into professional ones.

### **Fourth Lesson**

There is a need to define and clarify what we mean by professional security actors:

- (1) Security actors should not be involved either in politics or in business
- (2) Security actors should be put under democratic control/law (civil supremacy/democratic oversight)
- (3) Functions should be made specific so security actors can be differentiated from each other
- (4) Police should be separated from armed forces. Intelligence is not law enforcement agency

### **Fifth Lesson**

There is a need to institutionalise the SSR through legislation. The achievement should be measured through legal products. The achievements, so far, include:

1. At the level of the constitution, amendment to the constitution have been made. The main function of the Armed Forces is defence while the police is for internal security
2. At the level of the People's Assembly (the highest body of the political institution), the Armed Forces and the Police are no longer allowed to become members of parliament. The Police has been separated from the Armed Forces.
3. At the law level the Parliament has introduced three laws (Law on Armed Forces/TNI, Law on Defence=Military Reform and Law on Police/POLRI= Police Reform)

### **Sixth Lesson**

There is need to have academic community (epistemic community) who could bridge politician and military. The academic community should be objective and neutral and very helpful in drafting related bills

### **Seventh Lesson**

There is a need to take military reform step by step. The TNI has been put under democratic political control and

regarded as the instrument of the state. The Armed Forces have been put under the Ministry of Defence. The TNI can only be deployed through political decision for the purpose of protecting sovereignty, territorial integrity and safety of nation and state from military/armed threat. The TNI has an authority to conduct military operation than war (14 operations). All business activities of the TNI should be taken over by the government and the TNI, (individually and institutionally) is not allowed to run business activities (Article 76).

(could we have professional armed forces without professional budget?). The question here is military reforms into defence reform.

### **Eighth Lesson**

Military reform could be put in danger if police does not have the capacity to fill up the vacuum left by military. The Head of Police is not put under particular ministry. It has been put directly under the President. The Head of Police is responsible for operational and policy measures. As an institution, POLRI is structurally centralized. The POLRI has four functions:

- (1) Maintaining security
- (2) Preserving public order
- (3) Enforcing law
- (4) Protecting and serving society.

The POLRI has been given very broad authority to exercise their functions and it can be divided into 35 kinds of authority.

### **Ninth Lesson**

There is a need to:

- (1) amend/revise the existing laws especially law on police
- (2) strengthen institutional capacity of parliament (in drafting bill, budgeting and oversight)
- (3) introduce law on intelligence (intelligence is civilian institution: the question here is how to demilitarise intelligence and how to take measure of “de-policing” intelligence)
- (4) law on national security to strengthen coordination among security actors

### **Tenth Lesson**

There is a need to handle the problem of butter versus gun

## Conclusion

Indonesian military reform has been part of national endeavour that involved all concerned elements within the nation. This endeavour has accomplished formidable achievements, but they have been largely confined in the categories of normative-legal products and only lately in substantial terms in the form of white defence paper, defence doctrine, and defence strategy formulations by the department of defence. Indonesia has accomplished several formidable achievements in civil-military relations reform, comprising political neutrality of the military, disconnection of the military from political party, implementation of regulations for active members of the armed forces, re-organization of the armed forces in terms of abolition of social-political roles, etc.

A decade of military reform has transformed Indonesian civil-military relations in a significant way, from a total absence of control of the armed forces from both governmental and societal institutions, absence of civilian political leader that can be legitimately supported by all groups in a society, and absence of civilian leadership in the defence sector to existing institutions that can function as oversight to the armed forces and defence establishments. In the leadership of President Yudhoyono, the military began to be open to priority of civilian political participation in civil-military relations.

However, military reform should be conducted more in terms of formulations of defence policies and doctrines by Department of Defence as well as the armed forces. We have only also seen partial institutional integration of the military to civilian bureaucracy, as occurred in the DoD-military relation. Despite acquiring legal instruments for control of the armed forces, civilian policy-makers are still unable to envision an ideal defence posture for Indonesia.

Civilian supremacy over the armed forces should be affirmed in the structure of the state. It should materialize as a political authority embedded to a legitimate national leadership in conducting decision making process in defence sector.

Throughout the decade of Indonesian military reform, we found out that setting up normative-legal regulations for defence sector would not suffice the measures that we should undertake to reform it. Even if we have sufficient

regulations in the defence sector, which we do not yet have, we are still left with responsibilities to implement all the commitments in the regulations as well as amending defects in the legal products that may well emerge during the process of their implementation.

Indonesians also learnt that military reform, especially in terms of re-arranging civil-military relations, should not be conducted in spirit of punishing the military for what they have done in the past. This can lead to over-emphasis on the withdrawal of military from politics, which can create paralysis in the overall pace of military reform. Indonesian experience seemed to show that civilian politicians seemed to exhaust their endeavour to think about military reform after withdrawal of military from politics. Instead, civilian politicians felt that military withdrawal from politics was too soon since they still needed the military to support their political interests. Military involvement in social-political realm, as history suggests, has often been the product of civilian's inability to conduct responsible governance in fulfilling the needs of the people.

Finally, public support for a more substantial agenda of reform after the withdrawal of military from politics is also critical in avoiding paralysis of the reform. Indonesia's experience suggests that civilian politicians' tendencies to invite retired officers to participate in local and national elections, coupled with heavy media attention on how they work together to grab votes for public offices, have successfully diverted public attention from substantial agendas of military reform. Public needs to stay engaged with discussions that would provide critique and recommendations to newly-formulated defence policies as well as providing oversight in implementation of good governance in defence sector.

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